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Introduction 
In 1993 Kimberly and Pouvoirville published a survey and comparison of the 
migration of the American DRG system to European health care administration. The 
study of a total of nine countries showed that only two countries chose another 
solution than adopting the DRG system: Denmark and Germany
1
. However, they 
predicted that these two countries would adopt the DRG system as well since a “point 
of no return” had been reached in the dissemination of such measurement systems in 
the health service. The authors argued that the success and great impact of the DRG 
system could be explained by a particularly favourable context in the Western world. 
Among the nine countries in the 1993 study great variations were pointed out as to the 
extent each country had adopted the DRG system. Norway and Portugal were ranked 
among the countries that had made use the system to the greatest extent. The authors’ 
predictions about a point of no return due to a constellations of several favourable 
factors seems to have come true. Since 1993 the DRG system has expanded into new 
sectors and nations, including those that had not adopted the system in 1993. 
 
In this paper we will examine the differences in the adoption patterns in Norway and 
Denmark.  We will start out with the development in Norway, which appears to have 
been most “eager” among the European countries to adopt the DRG system, making 
use of top-down process of implementation.  In contrast we will compare with a 
preliminary description of the Danish example, which is characterized by a slow, soft 
implementation, with limited usage in the beginning. By studying differences in the 
adoption pattern in relatively similar cultures we may also improve the specific 
understanding of the mechanisms behind the DRG system’s expansion. By way of a 
comparison we will make an effort to illustrate common features as well as contrasts 
in the dynamics behind the promulgation of the DRG system. The main objective is to 
show that both the diffusion process itself and the historical institutional context itself 
may play a role.  
 
Despite the fact that Kimberly et al. pointed out that there were still examples of 
countries among the selected cases that had not introduced the system, they argued 
nevertheless that “irreversibility was reached in all countries, not only in the adoption 
of DRG, but also in the underlying logic”
2
. The diffusion of DRG was then only a 
secondary phenomenon viewed in the light of more basic change logic, an argument 
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which is reminiscent of a historical institutional or new institutional approach. It is 
implied that a paradigm shift takes place as to how several parties “perceive the 
hospital’s products, patterns for resource utilization and in understandings of how the 
production process must be supervised” (Kimberley et al 1993:361). Once you start to 
measure, you must continue to measure, and hence it is not decisive what kind of 
measurement system that is used, as it is shown in auditing literature (Power 2003). 
Also in countries that had not yet implemented the DRG system in 1993, Kimberly et 
al. believed that self-induced reinforcement processes would lead them to implement 
some kind of measurement system similar to the DRG system. 
 
According to the authors in question there are two different demand dynamics behind 
the process in which more and more adopt the DRG system: a policy market and a 
management market. Attention is called to the fact that the relative strength and the 
degree of connection between these “markets” vary. In principle it is possible for the 
management of each hospital to use DRG regardless of the political use of the 
concept, but not the other way around. The more autonomous the hospitals are, the 
stronger the managers are in relation to the policy-makers, and the stronger ties 
between politics and hospitals there are, the more important the politicians become as 
potential adopters of the DRG system. Thus, the story about the DRG system is a 
minor part of a meta-narrative emphasising an international trend along the lines of 
increased emphasis on performance management and management by objectives in 
the production of services.  
 
Clearly, the DRG-system itself plays a major role in the transformation of the hospital 
sector in major parts of the western world. It has been argued that the evolving 
structure of the hospital is dissonant with their traditional public service image and 
that the hospitals in the United States faced a legitimacy crisis as a consequence of the 
introduction of DRG (Geist and Hardesty 1992).   If this is a general problem in the 
United States, then one may presume that it is even more so in Europe, and that 
governments are to take an even more important role in attempts to legitimate 
hospitals and rebuild trust relations after the introduction of DRG in these countries.  
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We start out with a discussion on theoretical positions, then a discussion of the 
background of the system, as well as a comparison of growth and adoption patterns in 
Norway and Denmark.  
 
  
Theoretical Frame of Reference 1 – A Translation Perspective, carriers and 
translators – Scandinavian Institutionalism 
 
According to previous studies the DRG-framework offers an ideal opportunity to 
study institutionalization processes ( Covaleski, Dirsmith & Michelman 1993).   
In an institutional perspective the cognitive “taken-for-granted” aspect of the DRG 
system is emphasized; and the idea of cost control and product-specific prospective 
rates is then perhaps the superstandard that lies behind its journey into the hospital 
sector in the Western world. This way the application of DRG can appear as 
“correct”, ideal and like a ruling fact in modern health planning and politics (Meyer 
and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Røvik ibid. p. 19). In a Scandinavian 
neo-institutional translation model (Czarniawska & Sevon 1996) we take the 
following as our starting point: ideas/artefacts expand in time and space as a result of 
an ever-increasing number of new actors getting associated with the DRG-system. 
New fresh energy and diffusion power are released as the DRG system develops into 
a network. A translation perspective emphasise local actors role as translators, 
interpreters of ideas rather then imitators (Sahlin Andersson 2002, Nordgren 2006). 
The actors that relate to the DRG frame do not passively receive, but rather actively 
adapt and transform the ideas that are being circulated (Latour 1998). A silent 
naturalization is taking place as the DRG concept is translated into new contexts: ”A 
naturalized object has lost its anthropological strangeness. It is in that narrow sense 
desituated – members have forgotten the local nature of the object’s meaning” 
(Bowker & Star 1999:299).  
 
Translation and migration of ideas and recipes in connection with DRG can 
simultaneously be studied in a framework of carriers of management ideas or “path of 
entry” (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). The DRG system expansion in most 
Western countries during the last 25 years, would not have taken place without the 
fact that the DRG ideas were brought forward, broadcast, interpreted, converted and 
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supplied with new energy on its path by many carriers: academic researchers, 
government officials, consultants, professionals and managers in hospitals and in 
education institutions, the mass media and the scientific press (media) as well as the 
new  “networks of support”  established in national and international health policy and 
planning (Kimberley et al. 1993). 
 
DRG expansion can also be regarded as an example of international standardization 
(Brunsson 2004). For instance, a substantial coordination, joint knowledge production 
and exemplary dissemination take place between countries. In the Nordic region the 
so-called NordDRG collaboration is an example of standardization and 
institutionalisation of DRG practice. At the same time we see many examples of 
cross-sectoral expansion. The concept is put to use in more and more new areas in the 
health services, for instance in the support and rehabilitation of substance abusers, 
policlinics, rehabilitation, psychiatry, local health services etc. First of all this takes 
place by way of translation of knowledge within professional communities , but also 
by way of policy learning, by policy-makers looking for solutions in other places of 
the world (Marmor et al. 2005). At present knowledge concerning DRG pricing and 
piecemeal financing in psychiatry is being imported to Norway from Australia and 
Canada. Sweden represents an early “ideal” example of DRG applications in 
rehabilitation, and Norway follows also in this area. Swedish secondary classification 
of diagnoses for “open wards” is also being translated. Through this type of module 
import Norway is on its way to establish a performance-based financing system in all 
parts of the health service.  
 
The DRG system is used for different purposes in different places, and this is possible 
because it is just as much a label as a technology. As label it is associated with the 
efficient, trendy, modern, natural, general, efficient and future-oriented (cf. Meyer and 
Rowan 1977), as technology it is associated with a tool-box and a network of 
problem-solvers.   
 
 
Theoretical Frame of Reference 2 – Actor Explanations – Historical 
Institutionalism – Path Dependency 
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The other story brings us back to Kimberly et al.’s assertion that it is not necessarily 
the dissemination of the DRG system in itself, which should be the focus of attention 
since there are other forces behind the development. In a historical institutional 
perspective the focus of attention is more on cross-national differences such as how 
relations between interest groups are constituted historically, particularly the 
relationship between the medical profession and the government and to what extent 
the hospitals have been granted autonomy or not. This, in turn, may contribute to 
make single actors demand different politics and concepts at a different time and in 
different places (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). An important aspect is that institutions 
build upon historical experiences and that policy-making and institutional change is 
path dependent. At certain points of time, e.g. when a punctuated equilibrium or a 
critical juncture occurs, there is a break with the past and there is an opening for new 
opportunities for adoption of system transforming techniques and ideas. 
 
Originally the focus of attention in this tradition was on power, resources and 
interests. Gradually, more emphasis is put on the importance of ideas, and greater 
importance is also attached to policy-learning and transfer of concepts across 
communities and countries (Campbell 2004). In this case it is also natural to ask what 
kind of interest groups “demand” that the DRG system is adopted and what kind of 
ideas and frames are the underlying cause of such a demand.  
 
Furthermore, one will look for important change of directions, for instance in national 
health systems, where a new underlying logic emerges, which turns out to be 
“irreversible” at least in a short-term perspective, meaning the last 20 years. One may 
thus ask what were the particular conditions in each country that cultivated the ground 
for the adoption of the DRG-system and thereby also the path dependencies 
associated with this system.  Kimberley et al. (1993) mention three such conditions: 
pressure to modernize the administrative apparatus, search for new ways to stem the 
rising cost of health care, and the existence of champions that takes upon them the 
task to adopt the given technology in each national context.  
Empirical Material 1: Actors and Key Informants in the Norwegian and  Danish 
DRG Reception 
 
 7 
The primary sources of our study are based on informant interviews with central 
actors in the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish DRG network. In Norway we 
interviewed five central contributors: two at the Directorate of Health, two 
researchers, (previously at NIS, Norwegian Institute for Hospital Research), and one 
general manager in a local health care enterprise. All of the informants have 
experience from the early development work with DRG in Norway and in the Nordic 
collaboration (NordDRG). From Denmark the interviewee was a central key 
informant with experience from the Ministry of the Interior and Health and the 
National Board of Health. So the informants have comprehensive experience with the 
system in the research sector, the political milieu and the hospital sector. The 
interviewees have not only been observers, but have been active participants in 
research, administration and politics in connection with the DRG systems. Based on 
their information we will make a tentative effort to reconstruct and interpret the DRG 
journey, from the initial development of ideas to the stage where ideas have matured 
through research, translation, action research and testing.  
 
Empirical Material 2: Written Material 
Secondly, we have interpreted and analysed existing written material (literature 
reviews, research reports, public documents and official reports) in order to improve 
our understanding of the Norwegian and Danish DRG reception. The literature on this 
subject is very extensive, so we have concentrated on some central pieces of literature 
in the area. We have also made use of documents linked to early research projects in 
the development of the Norwegian DRG system, i.e. publications in DRG-related 
projects at NIS as well as evaluations of early DRG experimental projects in 
Norwegian hospitals. In addition, we have made use of Internet sites dealing with 
DRG issues in the Nordic countries. 
 
The DRG System – Origin and Diffusion 
”The material culture of bureaucracy and empire is not found in pomp and 
circumstance, nor even in the first instance at the point of a gun, but rather at the 
point of a list” (Bowker and Star 1999).  
 
The DRG system is an outstanding innovation in health planning and politics. It has 
spread to most Western countries during the last 30 years, and it has many areas of 
utilization and application (Kimberly & de Pouvourville Op.cit.). The DRG system is 
basically a classification system for patients, in which patients with similar 
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characteristics are grouped together. The classification of hospitalisation is based on 
what is generally accepted as homogeneous groups when it comes to clinical records 
and use of resources. The patients’ primary and secondary diagnoses constitute the 
main basis for the classification. Each group of DRGs has a pricing, which is based on 
cost weights or average level of resource use for hospitalisation in this group (Lian 
2003:76). The concept originated at Yale University in the US, where a group of 
researchers, including Robert Fetter (previously an engineer from the industry) and 
John Thomson (nurse), developed a classification system aimed at measuring 
hospitals’ productivity, efficiency, as well as management and control of the use of 
resources 
3
. The system, which was developed by Fetter and his fellow researchers for 
use in hospitals, had previously been applied in the industry for monitoring quality, 
efficiency and costs (Ministry of Health 1998; Lian 2003). This means that even then 
there was a “translation” from industry to health. In this way the engineers integrated 
the medical professional judgement within a production function and transformed 
hospitals to “hospital-factories” (Samuel, Dirsmith & McElroy 2005). In other words, 
at an early stage of the DRG system a coupling between the activities in two different 
knowledge spheres took place. One sphere was health economics and the other one 
was industrial cost accounting and quality development (Kimberly & de Pouvourville 
op.cit:7). During the 1970s the Yale researchers developed several versions and 
improvements of the DRG system. The first example of DRG application to public 
finance of hospitals came from the Reagan administration in USA at the beginning of 
the 1980s. The DRGs were then used for the first time as a financing system based on 
fixed prices in a public health service and thus as an instrument for the realization of 
neo-liberal health politics
4
.  
 
The First Reception of DRG Ideas in Norway 
When Robert Fetter in 1984 came to Norway and met with persons from NIS, he took 
part in making the draft for the first Norwegian project (Aas et. al. 1989). In this 
manner Fetter involved more and more researchers and health administrators in an 
international DRG network where Yale represented the authoritative centre, and with 
several university environments being involved.  The dissemination of ideas related to 
the DRG system took place by way of publication of DRG related articles in scientific 
magazines and journals. In the first Norwegian study (Aas 1985) a total of 116 
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scientific references is presented.   In the preface there is an obvious enthusiasm and 
optimism in relation to the DRG system: 
 
“It is possible to curb the growth in expenses in the hospital sector. The experience 
from the introduction of the DRG system in the US in 1984 is an indication of this. 
Also with a view to the other advantages of the DRG system, it is no surprise that the 
DRG interest has spread to a lot of Western industrialized countries.” (Aas 1985:1). 
 
The review, which was undertaken by the Norwegian Institute for Hospital Research 
(NIS), was a commissioned piece of work on behalf of the Health Directorate, and it 
provided a brief introduction to the DRG system’s historical account, construction and 
application areas. In contrast to other countries in Europe and Scandinavia, it appears 
that the DRG ideas were adopted early by actors in the central government 
administration, illustrated by the fact that the first study was commissioned by the 
Health Directorate. The DRG system gained a foothold at an early stage at the 
Ministry of Health
6
 and among other political actors (Hogsnes 1993). This has 
probably something to do with the fact that the Norwegian health research 
environments were small, that the bulkheads between the Ministry and hospital 
research environments (NIS) were relatively open, and the fact that the Ministry of 
Health had limited capacity to prepare reports in the subject area (Torjesen 2004).  
Only a few years after the first literature study by Aas in 1985, the application of 
DRGs was on the agenda after a suggestion from a state secretary committee. The 
proposal was included in the long term programme for the non-socialist Government 
for the 1986-1989 period. The idea was brought forward by the health economist Jan 
Grundt. He argued, among other things, that the application of the DRG system could 
act as an incentive to increased productivity in the hospital sector.  
 
The researchers doing the national translation work were connected to the creator 
himself. The collaboration between Norwegian researchers and the creator himself 
(Fetter) was set up in January 1985 when Robert Fetter visited SPRI in Sweden and 
NIS in Trondheim. Fetter offered his services and he personally made a project 
proposal concerning technical assistance, development and implementation of DRG-
based cost weights, budgets and management tools in Norway 
8
. In  1985 a project 
was established at Haukeland hospital in Bergen with researchers from NIS and the 
Ministry of Health.
 9
  The purpose of the project was to develop a Norwegian DRG 
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standard and at the same time carry out small-scale experiments at a few selected 
hospitals 
10
. In 1987  institutionalised, lasting and contractual collaboration was set up 
between NIS and Yale concerning translation of the Norwegian code classification 
system (ICD9) 
11
 to the American variant (ICD9-CM)
 12
. A more detailed basis for the 
project and the collaboration can be found in Fetter’s report (1989) about the 
Norwegian translation:  
The Norwegian classification system for procedures can be considered as national 
and is clearly different from the ICD9-CM procedure classification. It was decided to 
make Norwegian DRG definition as similar to US definitions as possible.”
13
  
 
We will now take a closer look at the continued journey of the DRG system to 
Norway, from early experiments in the beginning of the 1990s to the introduction of 
national DRG standards for financing somatic hospital operations in 1997. The point 
of interest in this period was perhaps first and foremost how the DRG issue became 
politicized and institutionalized, which in turn makes the political-institutional context 
important.  
 
The Eilertsen Committee – Experiments – National Standard and Performance-
Based Financing 
 
Some years would pass before there was a political will and majority to employ the 
system in a large scale. When experiences had proved that the system did not 
necessarily result in a more cost efficient operation, the concept was not abandoned 
for that reason, but rather connected to other current problems and recipes. The 
problems of hospital financing marked the public discussion in Norway throughout 
the 1980s. Accumulation of problems as a consequence of the existing block grant 
system was a hot potato.  The Eilertsen committee (NOU 1987:25) criticized, among 
other things, the existing block grants for not being suitable for performance- and 
goal-oriented management in the hospital sector. At the time performance 
management, or management by objectives was about to become a central standard in 
Norwegian public enterprises and public administration (Røvik Op.cit.). The Eilertsen 
committee was influenced by the management by objective trend and saw a disparity 
between block grants financing and decentralized management. The committee 
argued that block grants gave the hospitals insufficient change competence and that 
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the people who worked in the actual production at the hospitals did not get enough 
leeway under the “old” block grants system. For that reason the committee proposed 
to introduce an arrangement with DRG-based per-case financing (NOU 1987:25).  
 
It is reasonable to believe that the two concepts (DRG and management by objectives) 
have a close affinity to each other. Perhaps it is here that we see the combination of 
forces that leads to the “point of no return” in the adoption of the DRG-system noted 
by Kimberley et al (1993). The changes taking place in the Norwegian public sector 
during these years is reminiscent of the  transformations that occurred in corporations 
in the last century, along with widespread adoption of the multidivisional form. Such 
organizational forms are based on the idea of comparison and performance 
management and may lead to a management demand for the DRG-system and similar 
management tools (management market). The political milieu also needs such 
measurement system to legitimate increased expenses in an expanding health care 
state (policy market) (Byrkjeflot 2005).  Through greater commitment to activity 
planning, management by objectives and the corporate organizational form in the 
hospital sector, DRG has in this manner been one among a series elements of public 
sector reform aiming at establishing “private” organizational forms and quasi-
markets. It was argued that previously unsolved problems (lack of regional 
equalization of service supply, incentives and cost efficiency) could be solved through 
a combination of the DRG system and activity planning.  
 
DRG in the Norwegian variant saw the light of day as a financing system for the first 
time in the early 1990s. A small-scale experiment was then undertaken in the 
Nordland and Hordaland counties (1991-1993). The evaluation of these early 
experiments with DRG in Norway showed that per-case financing had not promoted 
cost efficiency. In addition, health personnel at the hospitals involved were not 
motivated by economic incentives (Solstad and Mo 1993:109; Lian 2003:77, Solstad 
1996, Hagen 1994). Health costs in Norway have continued to grow after DRG and 
activity-based-financing (ABF) were put into use as a national financing standard. 
DRG and ABF have increased activity and reduced waiting lists. Technical efficiency 
has increased, but due to the fact that wage expenditures also have increased more 
than expected per employee, the improvement in cost efficiency was insignificant. 
The DRG concept may have come up against the established values and norms in 
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healthcare institutions; “treat illness regardless of costs”.  If we turn to one of the 
main observers in connection with the development of the concept in Norway and 
Sweden, he gives the following answer to the question of how people in clinical 
operations reacted to the DRG system:  
 
“The Norwegian DRG system has been a system that came from the outside, in other 
words, from the Ministry of Health and was never founded on the specialist 
environments. This has, however, gradually started to change. People have started to 
understand that you have to live with it and take hold of it. Nevertheless, the initiative 
came from the outside.” 
 
DRG as a Financing System in Somatic Hospitals Linked to the 1997 Waiting List 
Guarantee
17
 
A few years would still pass after the early experiments before the DRG system 
gained national currency and became a central government standard for financing. 
Change to a new system of per-case reimbursement in Norway was resisted (Aas 
1995). The system was first rejected when the per-case experiment (including 
subsequent evaluations) was discussed in the Storting
18
 in summer 1995. Not until 
Gudmund Hernes took over after Werner Christie as Health Minister and after he had 
been thinking it through for 100 days, the idea of linking DRG to per-case was 
reactivated and reinforced (Lian 2003). One of our main informants (general manager 
in the Health Directorate) comments on this, among other things, in an interview 
(February 2004): 
“After the per-case-finance experiment everything was relatively quiet. But then 
something happened, first and foremost politically in that there was a rush in the 
Storting regarding additional grants. The major increase started in 1994
19
 and the 
interesting point here is that a need for measures emerged. In other words, there were 
a lot of additional grants from the Storting, how could this growth be stopped? Then 
introduction of the waiting list system, followed by guarantees.” 
 
Do you think that this is an example of a decision opportunity, in which one start 
looking for tools and solutions when new problems sail in? 
 
“Yes, exactly. I believe that is a correct description of what actually happened. There 
was a great need to get more out of the sector. You could not simply continue to pour 
money out to the county administrations. It was a real drain that was responsible for 
a lot of other activities, and the Storting felt that the money did not always end up for 
the purpose it was intended. In a way the DRG system became some kind of answer to 
the growth in hospital expenses – some kind of tool.” 
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At the moment new applications are being discussed in Norway in psychiatry, support 
and rehabilitation of substance abusers, municipal health service and rehabilitation
20
. 
It appears that possible shortcomings and dysfunctions in the system (creaming, 
DRG-creep, detrimental imbalance between somatic treatment and psychiatry etc.) 
call for further development, improvement and promulgation. As an instrument for 
cost control the system has proved to be inadequate, for instance in relation to costs 
per patient analyses. These inadequacies press for the need of new reforms. Today’s 
discussion is about the need for so-called cost per patient (PPT) analyses in which 
DRG has obvious deficiencies. More than 60 per cent of Norwegian hospitals report 
in a recent survey that they are making experiments with such a system, which is an 
alternative to the DRG system, based on “real costs” in each hospital, not a national 
average standard.  In order to acquire safer methods for cost analyses the government 
have set it as a task to develop a national, identifiable patient data register.  
 
By way of comparative discussion and juxtaposition we now sketch how the  
dissemination of the DRG system has taken place in Denmark. 
 
The Dissemination and Application of the DRG System in Denmark 
In Denmark it appears to be Kjeld Møller-Pedersen, professor at the University of 
Southern Denmark 
21
 and Anita Alban at the Danish Hospital Research Institute, who 
picked up the DRG system in 1984 – 1985 (Alban 1993, Møller-Pedersen 1987). We 
do not know this story in detail, but in Denmark as well there is an obvious research 
interest in the system at first, but gradually the resistance against the system increased. 
In Kimberley et al’s essay collection the situation is summed up as follows: 
 
“The attitudes of the involved parties have changed. There is now a generally 
accepted view that the DRGS are not the answer to the efficiency problem in Danish 
health sector.” (Alban 1993).  
In the article it is maintained that one has not reached the point of no return in 
Denmark, yet the book’s editors draw another conclusion. 
 
Central informants confirm that in the beginning of the 1990s the system was more or 
less banned. The County Council Organization 
22
 strongly believed in continued block 
grants management in the hospital sector and wanted to avoid centralized 
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management at any cost, for instance by way of DRG and piecemeal financing. The 
starting shot for application of DRG in Denmark came by way of the so-called SØK-
committee 
23
 on the hospital’s finances, which handed in its report in 1995. One of the 
recommendations was to commence the application of case-mix systems (DRG) in 
order to measure the hospitals’ productivity. The problem with the first productivity 
measurements was the great resistance when the reports came up against in the 
specialist environments. As one of our main informants acknowledges: 
 
“When I gave a lecture for 42 doctors (1996) about the experiences with productivity 
measurements from North Jylland, one doctor got up and quite simply bawled me out. 
Nobody had confidence in the case-mix system (DRG) based on the American 
standard unless it was made Danish.” 
 
The bureaucracy and the political milieu in Denmark did not particularly believe in 
the DRG system either. In order for the system to become acceptable, it was argued,  a 
Danish version had to be worked out, based on Danish cost structures and diagnosis 
groupings. 
24
  The DRG-system in Denmark was for this reason developed strictly 
based on a voluntary participation by the counties and hospitals. In the Danish 
tradition for health reform it has been common for central health authorities to rely on 
dialogues and collaboration with local health authorities. Researchers have been 
involved in this consensus-oriented system.  The Norwegian approach of top-down 
implementation of the DRG-system may for this reason have been a less likely option 
in the Danish setting. The important role of the Danish County Council Organization 
has to be taken into consideration, which along with the clinical specialist 
organizations has contributed to a distinctive consensus-seeking work-style. 
Objections against uncritically adapting a system that was built on US clinical 
practice and US diagnostic codes came also from researchers (Møller- Pedersen 1987, 
Magnussen 1995).  Consequently, it became more important to convert the DRG 
system along the lines of something that could make a fit with the Danish policy-
making style, for instance by developing a separate context-based variant of Nord-
DRG. From the 1990s several pilot projects were put into action. 
25
 When free 
hospital choice between the counties was introduced in 1993, DRG based rates were 
put into use as a basis for settlements of accounts for guest patients. Later on in 2000 
the big breakthrough came. Danish politicians decided to introduce 100 per cent 
settlements of accounts of guest patients based on the DRG-system. At the same time 
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an activity-based financing arrangement was introduced through the new Finance Act 
(1999). This arrangement was 10 per cent DRG rates combined with 90 per cent block 
grants financing
26
. Particularly in comparison with Norway in the area of DRG, then, 
Denmark has adopted and introduced DRGs as a voluntary option. Whereas Norway 
has gone through a “revolution” in the introduction of the DRG-system, Denmark has 
gone through 10 year of slow “evolution”. Central health authorities describe this in 
their own words as a “softening” to increase the interest for DRG and as a way to 
“make the hospitals run for rewards”. The DRG-system in Denmark is developed 
strictly on a voluntary basis and counties are not obliged to use the DRG-system in the 
local activity based financing models. Yet the objective, also in Denmark, is to pave 
the way for free hospital choice and incentive management in the hospitals. Another 
step forward for the introduction of the DRG-system in Denmark came with the  2001 
Folketing
27
 election, when Venstre
28
 formed a government for the first time. A more 
populist policy and a greater willingness to make use of open market-style techniques 
materialized in the new Health Minister Lars Lykke Rasmussen, who knew what he 
wanted to do with the DRG system. The bureaucrats in the Ministry of the Interior 
and Health that had previously been hesitant and sceptical of the DRG system, had to 
submit to the new political leadership. Activity-based financing (ABF) and incentive 
management have pressed forward in the wake of Lars Lykke Rasmussen. In 
connection with the new Finance Act in 2002 funds were earmarked (1 1/2 billion) to 
increase treatment capacity and reduce waiting lists. For 2003 1 billion was allocated 
as payment for increased activity. In 2004 the counties and the government agreed 
that ABF would constitute 20 per cent of the budget. After the 2005 Folketing election 
the confidence in Venstre was renewed. Lars Lykke Rasmussen continued as Interior 
and Health Minister, and he continued with incentive management in order to attend 
to his populist promises. After 2005 the arrangement with activity-based financing 
and DRG rates includes a voluntary arrangement for the counties, with 20 per cent as 
minimum and 50 per cent as maximum ABF financing. From 2007 a big structural 
reform will be implemented. Fourteen counties and the Copenhagen Hospital 
Corporation will be reduced to five regions and 271 existing municipalities will be 
reduced to 98 new municipalities. The single most important task of the regions is to 
run and manage the hospitals. As a part of the reform the governmental ABF-based 
pool will be raided from 1-2 per cent to 5 percent. The municipalities in the regions 
will co pay health care for their own citizens calculated as a share of the DRG-rates.
29
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The patients will also pay a fixed amount per inhabitant to the region. The counties 
have been antagonistic to the Structural reform, partly because tasks will be 
transferred to the regions, and because the new financing model. In this model the 
new regions will be totally dependent on financing by the municipalities and the state. 
In this way it  seems that also Denmark has reached a point of no return. The re-
elected Danish government has declared that ABF in hospital should be increased 
from 20 to 50 per cent – a development that is expected to increase the use of the 
DRG-system.
30
 From the ministry it is found that there is currently no better 
alternative than DRGs as a system for information and allocation of funds in the 
health care sector and there is no wish for a return to a condition with very little 
knowledge of cost structures. 
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Comparative Discussion, Norway Versus Denmark 
We have presented a translation perspective and a historical-institutional perspective 
of cross-national diffusion of the DRG system. We have told the story about how the 
DRG system was invented and how it expanded into new terrains, and the various 
phases of adoption in Norway, as well as making a comparison with similar processes 
in Denmark.  Why was the DRG system implemented so quickly in Norway while it 
took longer time in Denmark? What was the reason for a weaker resistance in 
Norway, at least among the major actors mentioned by Kimberley et al.? 
 
 
 
In tables 1 and 2 below we have made a preliminary summary of the Norwegian and 
Danish DRG history. 
 
Table 1: DRG reform history in Norway 
Norway 
Year DRG 
application 
Reform 
history 
Political climate Course of 
development  
1984 –
1990 
 
 
 
Entry of ideas 
Start-up of initial 
research 
NIS Literature 
study 
Long-term 
programme  non-
socialist 
government 
 
Willoch 2  
(coalition) Heløe 
Neo-liberalism 
 
 
 
Phase of ideas 
Adopted by the 
research sector 
NIS 
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Year DRG 
application 
Reform 
history 
Political climate Course of 
development  
 
 
1987 
 
 
 
1990-
1993 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2005 
Used for 
productivity 
measurements 
 
 
Piecemeal 
experiment, 
Hordaland and 
Nordland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activity-based 
funding (ABF 
50%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISF (40-60%) 
 
 
 
 
 
The Eilertsen 
committee 
NOU1987:25 
Proposal for 
financing system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Waiting list 
guarantee 
ABF becomes  
national standard  
Report to the 
Storting no. 44 
 
 
 
 
Patient Rights Act  
 
 
 
 
Hospitals owned 
by central 
government, 
centralization 
Competition 
 
 
Free hospital 
choice 
 
Brundtland 2  
(86-89) 
Neo-liberalism, 
consolidation of the 
welfare state 
 
 
 
Brundtland 3 
(90-96) 
Hernes 1995 
 
(Jagland 1996) 
Gudmund Hernes – 
National reformist 
politician + support 
from the Progress Party 
(Frp)
32
 
Neo-liberalism and 
reform technocracy 
 
Høybråten 
“Health Act package” 
(minority  + the 
Progress Party) 
 
 
 
Tønne (minority + the 
Progress Party) 
 
 
 
 
 
Gabrielsen (market, 
strenthened patient 
rights) 
Haukeland hospital 
 
 
 
 
Increase in political 
interest and  new  
proposals for 
application 
Experimental phase 
 
 
 
 
Political application 
 
Resolution in the 
Storting 
Top-down 
implementation  
Rapid implementation 
6 months 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pressure towards 
standardization – 
psychiatry and rehab.. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: DRG reform history in Denmark 
 
Denmark 
Year DRG 
application 
Reform 
history 
Political 
climate 
Course of 
development 
1985 
 
 
1987 
 
 
 
Productivity 
 
 
The Health 
Ministry is 
DRG is banned 
in counties, due 
to the resistance 
in the County 
Adopted by the  
research sector 
University of 
Southern Denmark 
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Year DRG 
application 
Reform 
history 
Political 
climate 
Course of 
development 
 
 
 
1988 
 
1993-1995 
 
 
1993 
 
 
1999 
2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2004 
measurements 
Information system 
planning 
 
 
Local experiments 
 
Basis for 
settlements of 
accounts between 
the counties for 
guest patients 
 
 
100% settlements 
of accounts for 
guest patients 
(DRG-use 
voluntary) 
 
Financing system 
10% DRG rates 
Activity stimulus 
top financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rate system 
20 – 50% ABF (20 
min., 50 max.) 
 
  
established. 
 
 
 
Resistance after 
report from DHI  
DHI strategy 
paper:  
local 
experiments 
 
SØK-committee 
 
 
Free hospital 
choice 
 
 
 
Finance Act 
ABF 
 
 
 
 
Finance Act 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Council 
Organization 
 
Resistance in 
central 
administration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lars Lykke 
Rasmussen and 
Venstre (Liberal 
Party) populism 
Rights and 
market 
 
 
 
 
 
Strong political 
leadership 
The 
administration 
submits 
DSI 
 
“Softening” of 
attitude  to DRG  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Danish DRG, variant 
of the NordDRG on 
the basis of Danish 
cost structures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consensus-style top-
down, bottom-up 
 
Comprehensive  
consensus-oriented 
work (clinical 
validation) 
colaborating with 
clinical specialist 
organizations  
 
 
A common feature between Norway and Denmark is to begin with the fact that the 
DRG system was first adopted by researchers and research institutions.  It was here 
the first reception took place: in Norway, at NIS, and in Denmark at the University of 
Southern Denmark and at DSI (Danish Institute for Health Services). The health 
economics environments are in charge of this reception and early interest from the 
mid-1980s. Nevertheless the roads go separate ways from here. In Norway, the ideas 
associated with the use of DRG as a financing system was picked up early on by the 
political management at the Ministry of Health. It was the Directory of Health that 
commissioned the first literature review, and as early as 1987 the DRG system was 
presented as a way to improve efficiency in the health sector in a public report,  the 
Eilertsen committee. The central state was taking an early initiative in the Norwegian 
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translation of DRG, and it took many years for the Danish Health Ministry to develop 
a similar interest. In Norway the first per-case experiments  concerning DRG as a 
financing system were joint projects between hospitals, researchers and the Ministry 
of Health. Such experiments came later and were to a lesser extent coordinated with 
the healthcare bureaucracy in Denmark.   
 
Policy demands for an improved control system in the healthcare sector 
It seems that a changing “policy market” can explain much in both countries. Even 
though Norway started with experiments early and the system soon caught interest in 
the administration, a few years would pass until the system was  applied as a 
financing system. Even though the per-case experiments had not honoured the 
expectations, the big breakthrough took place as a consequence of Gudmund Hernes 
becoming Health Minister in 1997 (Slagstad 1998, Berg 2005). As a sociologist 
taking an interest in economic models, it was natural for Hernes to make use of 
incentives that would both yield better health returns and improved utilization of 
resources (Berg ibid. p. 81). At the same time these ideas could get support from the 
right-wing populist Progress Party, for which accessibility and waiting lists were 
important part of the rhetoric to win votes. Hernes’ reformist, technocratic 
management enthusiasm coincided with Norwegian right-wing populism.  
 
In parallel to this it is an interesting parallel point that Lars Lykke Rasmussen a few 
years later represents the big breakthrough in Denmark within a populist Liberal 
Party. It is pretty much the same ideas, which are brought forward as an argument in 
favour of ABF in Denmark, i.e. patient rights, incentives and improved utilization of 
resources. In the light of this the DRG concept got its decisive breakthrough in both 
countries by a way of strong political management and policy processes.  
 
Even though there has been convergence in policy-making during the latter years 
between the two countries, there are still historical differences that may still be of 
importance. First of all the process in Norway was forced through far more rapidly. 
After a 1997 resolution concerning ABF in Norway it took only six months until the 
new financing system was implemented with an ABF share of 50 per cent. In Norway 
there was a tough top-bottom implementation and a broad dissemination of the 
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technology. In Denmark, on the other hand, the ABF share has constituted a moderate 
10% since 2001 as stimulating means and top financing to be chased by the hospitals. 
In addition, the Danish case represents a model of soft implementation, voluntarily 
marked by dialogue, and flexibility. This is also the case from 2004 as illustrated with 
a voluntary fluid rate system between 20 and 50%. While the Norwegian process has 
been rapid and unpredictable , the Danish process has been softer and more 
predictable.  The Danish hospitals have been able to adjust to the system slowly 
during a period of 5 – 6 years. For that reason the degree of penetration has been 
considerably less in Denmark, as well.  
 
A translation and standardisation view 
The first similar observation in both countries is change into new dominant 
knowledge regimes in health planning and health policy. A new normative heavy 
pendulum: utilitarianism and economic rationality have spread to health political 
discourses. The ideologically heavy trend of New Public Management and search for 
an instrument to fit with the idea of management by objectives may very well have 
created a demand for the DRG concept. DRG also became a “fashion”, a symbol of 
how resources in the health sector could be allocated in more rational and efficient 
way. Throughout many years Norway and Denmark have along with the other Nordic 
countries, developed and maintained a Nordic DRG standard (Nord-DRG)
 33
. In the 
light of this standardization and the cross-country learning processes associated with 
these cross-national institutions are relevant explanations for the trend towards 
convergence between Norway and Denmark in the long run. Interpreted in a 
translating perspective we can say that the DRG- system has been transformed into 
different local national contexts dependent on different historical paths. The 
translating started earlier in Norway then in Denmark, but the use of the DRGs has 
become more and more similar in the to countries. Bout countries started out with 
casemix development as a tool of productivity analysis, but both countries has 
increased the use of DRGs to financing purposes. 
 
In Norway and Denmark as in many other countries it seems like the research milieus 
played a decisive role early on in the diffusion and translation of ideas.  Relatively 
few actors in Norwegian and Danish research and administration have been central in 
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the adoption of ideas.  Networks for technical assistance have been established both 
on the national and international level where DRG ideas have been supplied with 
renewed power and energy that have brought them quickly into political decision 
processes.  
A historical-institutional explanation 
A question brought up was  why the resistance to the adoption of the DRG-system 
was stronger in Denmark than in Norway. We have referred to the stronger position of 
the County Councils in Denmark and a weaker tradition for the central state taking the 
initiative in healthcare reform than in Norway. Norway was early in being the first to 
put the American standard into use, while Denmark condemned it “to rack and ruin” 
and aimed at developing its own case-mix system. Both countries have, however, left 
the American standard and have been involved in the Nordic DRG collaboration, in 
which Norway relatively quickly used the system for financial purposes, while 
Denmark in the first years first and foremost used it as an information system for 
productivity measurements in hospitals.  
 
The county administrations’ big budget deficits, unsatisfied needs and increasing 
patient queues, as well as annual additional grants by the Storting, formed a problem 
area, which in turn resulted in favourable conditions for a search for better solutions 
for the financing of Norwegian hospitals. In Denmark the situation was different.   
There was not a similar problem with increase in hospital budgets, and there was a 
different tradition for dealing with financing problems in the hospital sector. Counties 
in Denmark have historically been in a more autonomous position with regards to tax 
collection and financing than in Norway. In Norway, the counties had no such right to 
set their own tax rates and collect their own taxes. The rate for the county tax was set 
by the state and there was no difference between the counties. This contrast may 
explain why there was less interest for the new financing system in the Danish 
context. The Norwegian counties had a much weaker position in their relationships 
with the state, and the position became weaker and weaker as a larger share of the 
funds for the hospital sector came from the state.   
 
This paved the way for the hospital reform in Norway where the state took over 
ownership of hospitals from the counties and granted the hospitals status as state 
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enterprises (Byrkjeflot 2005). The DRG-system and an introduction of the principle of 
Activity-Based-Funding in combination with the Norwegian health enterprise model 
has been a way for the health ministry to balance control and autonomy; to keep the 
hospitals on an arm length distance from the ministry at the same time as they 
establish more control by setting the premises for resource flows and by controlling 
by direct means through their ownership position (Byrkjeflot 2005). 
In contrast to Norway, had none of the Danish counties introduced the DRG system in 
1993 (Alban 1993) and its still up until these days voluntary to use DRG´s in contract 
negotiations. This situation has changed gradually
34
 and will possibly change more as 
a consequence of the structural reform. The Danish context, with the different power 
relationships and linkages between research environments, central health authorities 
and counties is probably the most important reason why Denmark has gone through a 
long-standing maturation process, and it has taken more time to develop a special 
Danish case-mix system. 
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Final comments 
If we go back to the starting point, Kimberly´s argument that “irreversibility was 
reached in all countries” (DRG´s  as a global super standard), we should not ignore 
the way it represents a good example of a resourceful, well-organized supply side and 
perhaps a less developed demand side in many countries – a story that make a fit in 
the case of Norway. The DRG system that was developed by Fetter and his colleagues 
at Yale, was the first case-mix management advance, and there were no other 
competing concepts in the initial phase. The study of DRG in Norway and Denmark 
has showed that it is not only a matter of fashion trends, but also of development of 
policy –learning networks and changes in power relations. The carriers have provided 
the concept with renewed energy in the same way as American management caught 
the wind in the wake of the Marshall plan. The technological, research and financial 
dominance that USA have had in the Western world since World War 2 is of 
importance in order to understand that hospital financing models were brought in 
from the US as well. Technological enthusiasts, American laboratory conditions, 
multinational concerns (3M), prestigious research institutions (Yale University), and a 
far-reaching consultant-based support network, constitute a strong supply side. At the 
same time as more and more countries put the system into use, a form of 
standardization takes place. As the Eastern Europeans are now also putting the system 
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into use the DRG-system is becoming more and more the “Euro” of the health-care 
sector.  
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 The DRG system (Diagnosis Related Groups) is a grouping system, which on the basis of diagnosis 
codes, surgical procedural codes, gender, age, and discharge routines group the admitted patients in 
approx. 510 groups. The groups are in compliance with certain criteria that are both medically 
significant and homogeneous when it comes to use of resources. The grouping relies on 20,000 
diagnoses and 6,500 procedural codes. The DRG system entails a considerable schematizing and 
simplification of the clinical reality.  Throughout the years, since the end of the 1970s, several DRG 
variants have developed, but they all build on the basic criteria. DRG was originally developed as a 
quality assurance system at the end of the 1970s. 
 
2
 Irreversibility occurs when you have passed the point where you can no longer return to the previous 
situation. 
 
3
 As early as in 1967, two years after the beginning of the Medicare programme, a group of physicians 
began to use traditional productivity concepts in the health sector. Later on this was established as a 
separate research project at Yale University under the direction of Professor Robert B. Fetter. During 
this research systematic mapping of how to describe the activities in a hospital was carried out. In the 
model that was developed the researchers focused on the accumulation of hospitalizations and 
discharges in relation to the patients’ hospitalizations. The tool used by the researchers was a grouping 
of hospitalizations in diagnosis groups based on the International Classification of Diseases 
(Norwegian Official Report NOU 2003:1p 90). 
 
4
 During 1960-1973 hospital spending increased considerably in the US. The increase in expenses was 
256% per hospitalization day and 266% per hospitalization. In 1983, when the American Senate passed 
the bill to employ a prospective payment system based on DRG in Medicare, which comprised 30 
million people, the bill was only subject to a 40 minute debate. The well-known economist Eli 
Ginzberg has interpreted this as an act of desperation in which the law was passed to make the 
impression that the Reagan administration was competent in handling the growth of expenses in the 
health sector (Source. Aas 1985:3).  
6
 The name of the ministry has changed over the years. Currently the name is: The Ministry of Health 
and Care Services. For the sake of ease Ministry of Health has been used in this paper. 
 
8
 Ulf Ljungblad, current director at Østfold Hospital (part of Eastern Norway Regional Health 
Authority), reports in an interview with the author (December 2004) that he and a couple of “friends”, 
Pål Aksel Nilsson (gynaecologist) and Stig Aremark (gynaecologist) brought this home to Sweden in 
the mid-1980s and translated it into a local Swedish model at the Gothenburg Hospital in collaboration 
with the Swedish Planning and Rationalization Institute (SPRI). 
 
9
 In March 1991 Robert Fetter was back in Norway together with representatives from Minnesota 
Mining and Minerals (3M) at the request of the Ministry of Health. The meeting took place at 
Haukeland Hospital and the purpose was to impart experience from so-called outpatient grouping. 
 
10
 Later on the project was established with support from the Ministry of Health for the period 1986-
1990. 
 
11
 The international classification system for diseases, injuries and death cause (ICD) has been around 
for approx. 100 years and it is revised approx. every 10 years through the World Health Organization 
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(WHO). In January 1987 Norwegian health authorities implemented the ICD-9 as a national standard. 
The Norwegian ICD-9 was at that time very similar to the international ICD-9 that was developed by 
the WHO in 1977. 
 
12
 The DRG system developed by Fetter (ICD9-CM) was the first case-mix management offensive in 
the market. The system had already been used on a national scale in the USA. 
 
13
 Here the technology committee gave specific guidance as to the “necessary translation”. ”The 
computer program for DRG-grouping developed in USA (developed by 3M) accepts only ICD9-CM 
disease and procedure codes. Norwegian disease and procedure codes cannot be used directly for 
DRG-classification. It was necessary to make a mapping which converts Norwegian disease and 
procedure codes to a corresponding ICD9-CM code” (Ail et. al 1989: pp.5 and 7). 
 
17
 St.meld. nr. 44 (1995-96) 
 
18
 Storting is the  Norwegian Parliament 
 
19
 The real value growth in somatic hospital expenses in Norway increased tremendously from 1995 to 
1997, more than 7% per year. The growth was, however, closely linked to the wage increase and must 
be viewed in the light of the wage settlements. The growth represents a considerable growth in the use 
of resources as well. There was a tremendous growth of approx. 12,000 man-labour years from 1990 to 
2000 (NOU 2003:1). 
 
20
 The development of new procedural codes in mental health care, support and rehabilitation of 
substance abusers is scheduled to be completed as a test version on 1
st
 December 2006. 
 
21
 Syddansk Universitet  
 
22
 The County Council Organization, i.e. Amtrådsforening, is a joint organization for the 13 counties in 
Denmark, plus Bornholm’s regional municipality 
 
23
 The hospitals economy 
 
24
 The administrative staff stated that the analysis was not valid because it used cost wights from 
Norway. On the other hand the clinical staff stated that the Nordic grouping (NordDRG) did not reflect 
Danish clinical practice.  
 
25
 In 1994 the Ministry of Health set up a committee lead by Karin Kristensen to test the casemix 
methodology making a productivity analyses based on casemix. The first analysis was performed in the 
county of Northern Jutland. 
 
26
 In most counties a 90/10 model has been applied. The model implies that only production which 
exceeds fixed block grant production is paid according to activity. The settlements of accounts rates for 
production exceeding the block grant production varied between 10 and 100 per cent of the DRG rate. 
 
27
 Folketing is the name of the Danish Parliament. 
 
28
 Venstre is called Denmark’s Liberal Party. 
 
29
 With a maximum payment of 4.000,- DKK for in-patients and 270,- DKK for out-patients. 
 
30
 Poul Erik Hansen, National Board of Health DK 
 
31
 Poul Erik Hansen, National Board of Health DK.  
 
32
 Frp (The Progress Party) is Norway’s most populistic party. 
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33
 From 1995 the Nordic health authorities entered into a collaboration to develop an open, accessible, 
Nordic version of the DRG system, which has been named Nord-DRG and is based on the American 
HFCA-DRG (NOU2003:1). 
 
34
 The introduction of top-financing from the government contributed to changing the attitudes to the 
DRG-system in the counties. The calculation of baseline production was still a question of discussion 
between the counties and the Minstry of Health and the National Board of Health. 
 
35
 From 1998 to 2001 The Ministry of Health carried out a clinical validation of NordDRG in 
cooperation with the clinical societies. The new system called DkDRG was implemented from 2002. 
